Although this work not only counters the Wittgensteinian proscription against definitions but does so relative to just that example by which Wittgenstein intended to show that the search for definitions is futile, the author cautions in the Preface that it was not his objective to write an "anti-anti-definitional manifesto." Yet engaging as this study is, the definition in which it culminates will neither dissuade the Wittgensteinians nor fully convince those more sympathetic with its aims, for the treatment of such topics as make-believe games and "Bernean" games seems less than conclusive, and the definition's implications may be problematical for questions such as, e.g., whether love-making is to be construed as a game and whether activities governed by Robert's rules of order qualify as games. As a result, it is clear that the search for a definition of game is meant to be a case that falls under the eventual definiendum. The author assures unity of form and content by presenting the material in the manner of a philosophical dialogue and then by embellishing the dialogue with genial language and charming examples. The exposition consists in the defense of a proposed definition against an array of criticisms until, after considerable exploration, a revised definition is arrived at to which no further objection is made. It incorporates material from papers earlier published in Philosophy of Science, Ethics and in Osterhoudt's Philosophy of Sport.
The work under consideration attempts to discover a definition of game such as may serve as a foundation for a philosophical theory of games.
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